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INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, this Court reduced the timeframe for an arrested person to be taken to the 
nearest available magistrate for the setting of bail from 48 hours to 24 hours under Rule 7 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellees' Brief makes it clear that Appellees 
believe that the timeframe should reasonably be set at seventeen (17) days. Appellant 
respectfully submits that it should be up to a jury of his peers, not a judge ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment by making findings of fact, to determine whether a 
municipality's failure to bring an arrestee before a magistrate constitutes a flagrant 
violation of an arrestee's constitutional rights. 
Importantly, Appellees' Brief does not respond to Appellant's assertion that the 
District Court erred in granting Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment based upon a 
finding of fact that Appellant did not suffer a flagrant violation of his constitutional 
rights. Appellees spend ample time reviewing the factors in Spackman ex ref. Spackman 
v. Bd. ofEduc., 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533 and deflecting from the issue of the District 
Court'sfactual findings that underpin its granting Appellees' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, yet fail to argue that the District Court appropriately made findings of fact 
regarding the flagrant nature of Appellant's continued jailing.1 Appellees' failure to 
address the District Court's factual findings is especially confounding when considering 
that the Appellant submitted an affidavit in the proceedings below averring that he was 
1. At one point, Appellees even go so far as to argue that Appellant had a duty to marshal 
facts- a procedural point that would and should be well taken had there been a trial. See, 
Appellees Brief at page 15. There was, however, no trial. 
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never informed of the amount of the bail set by the Justice Court- a contention not refuted 
by Appellees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The issues raised in Appellant's Brief were preserved below. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the issues addressed in Appellant's Brief were 
preserved in the proceedings below and that Appellant's Brief contains citations to the 
relevant portions of the record demonstrating that those issues were raised and preserved. 
Appellees are aware that these issues were raised and preserved, as Appellees' counsel 
has remained the same throughout these proceedings, but Appellees continue to argue that 
technicalities foreclose Appellant from obtaining any relief for the denial of his 
constitutional rights, ostensibly in an attempt to obtain blanket immunity for Appellees. 
Notably, Appellees do not argue that the issues regarding the interpretation and 
application of Spackman were not raised or preserved, but that they were not specifically 
cited to in one portion of Appellant's Brief. Appellees argue, without citation to any 
supporting case law,2 that not citing to the preservation in one specific portion of 
Appellant's Brief is fatal to Appellant's appeal. However, this Court has indicated that it 
may also look to "the argument second of their brief' that contain "citations to the record 
2. This Court has refused to rule on cases where an Appellant failed to cite to specific 
preservation in the record where the issue was not raised and preserved below or where 
the Appellant thereafter argues plain error. Inasmuch as Appellant cited to the 
preservation of the arguments throughout Appellant's Brief, it is clear that Appellant 
raised and preserved the issues addressed in Appellant's Brief and is not asserting plain 
error here. See, Don Juan at ~~21-22, 844. 
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showing that the claim was actually preserved." Ortega v. Ridgewood Estates LLC, 2016 
UT App 131, ~ 27,379 P.3d 18, 25, cert. denied sub nom. Ortega v. Ridgewood Estates, 
384 P.3d 568 (Utah 2016) citing to Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration 
Network, 2012 UT 84, ~ 101,299 P.3d 990. Importantly the, "purpose ofthepreservation 
requirement is to put the district court on notice of an issue and provide it with an 
opportunity to rule on it." Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72, ~ 20,266 P.3d 839, 843. 
As demonstrated below, Appellant's Brief contains relevant record cites demonstrating 
that the issues raised in Appellant's Brief were, in fact, preserved below and that the 
District Court was on notice of the issues before it and made rulings which are now the 
subject of this appeal. 
Appellant would first note that, as set forth in Appellant's Brief at footnote 3, the 
District Court's Final Order did not reach the second and third Spackman factors, as the 
Final Order (drafted by Appellees) made a finding of fact that Appellant had not suffered 
a flagrant violation of his constitutional rights. Thus, Appellant respectfully submits that 
the threshold issue before this Court is whether the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment (based upon fmdings of fact) that Appellant had not suffered a 
flagrant violation of his constitutional rights. The First Issue in Appellant's Brief- "Did 
Appellant demonstrate the elements required under Spackman ex rei. Spackman v. Bd. of 
Educ., 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533, to proceed with his claim for monetary damages under 
the Utah Constitution?" -was clearly preserved and is referenced in the "Course of the 
Proceedings and Disposition Below" section of Appellant's Brief, wherein Appellant 
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cited this Court to the Final Order in which the District Court made the "factual finding" 
that, "Plaintiff cannot show any flagrant violation of his Utah constitutional rights by Box 
Elder County." See, Appellant's Brief at 6-7, citing to the Final Order (R. 984-986) and 
Appellant's Supplemental Brief in Response to Questions Raised by the Court Following 
AprilS, 2016 Hearing on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment ("Appellant's 
Supplemental Brief') R. 868-886. Appellant's Supplemental Briefbelow explicitly 
argued that "retaining Plaintiff in Jail was a flagrant violation of Plaintiffs due process 
rights." R. 876. Appellant's Supplemental Brief thereafter spends no less than nine (9) 
pages arguing that the Appellees committed flagrant violations of Appellant's 
constitutional rights for various reasons, including that Appellant was "never been hailed 
before a magistrate ... " R. 876 at FN 2. 
Regarding the second Spackman factor - no other existing remedies - this issue 
was also raised and preserved in Appellant's Supplemental Brief as well as at oral 
argument. Appellant's Brief at 7, R. 879. Lastly, Appellant's Supplemental Brief cited to 
the arguments entertained by the District Court regarding the third Spackman factor -
equitable relief as being wholly inadequate -during oral argument when the District Court 
inquired as to whether a potential habeas corpus claim was sufficient to satisfy the third 
Spackman factor. The Court specifically stated that it was "going to have to wrap my 
mind around remedies" after stating "we're talking about a time of limited duration and 
being able to process a habe[as]" corpus action." Appellant's Brief at 32-33; R. 1023. 
During that exchange, the Court specifically inquired of counsel, "let's talk for just a 
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second. Habeas corpus ... you're wrongfully imprisoned. Habeas corpus under the State of 
Utah, the law, is available." R. 1022. Appellant's counsel argued, however, that Judge 
Shelby, in fact, found that a habeas corpus action was "not available." R. 1024. The 
District Court clarified- "So your position still is for it to be a remedy it would have to be 
one that is actual[ly] available to ... the party." R. 1024. It is clear from the record below 
that the First Issue on appeal was preserved below. 
Regarding the Second Issue in Appellant's Brief- "Did the District Court err in 
granting Summary Judgment by entering a factual finding that Appellant could not show 
any flagrant violation of his Utah constitutional rights by the Appellees?"- the thrust of 
this argument, and the repeated contention by Appellant in opposing Appellees' Motion 
for Summary Judgment below, is that the factual issue of whether Appellees' actions 
constituted a flagrant violation of Appellant's constitutional rights is a question for a jury 
of Appellant's peers, not for a judge to decide. R. 697, 957. This argument was clearly 
preserved. 
Regarding the Third Issue in Appellant's Brief- "Did the District Court err in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees by entering a factual finding that 
Appellant could not identify a specific individual who flagrantly violated Appellant's 
constitutional rights?"- Appellant's Brief also cites to the hearing wherein the Appellant 
argued, and the Court addressed, that naming a specific governmental employee is 
necessary to satisfying the Spackman factors. See, Appellant's Brief at 38, R. 941-942. 
The oral argument was held after the Court requested the parties address this specific 
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issue, which was briefed in Appellant's Supplemental Brief and thus the issue was raised 
and preserved. R. 879. 
Appellees also contend that Appellant has raised new issues - that Article 1, 
Section 8 of the Utah Constitution (the "Bail Clause") is self-executing, that being 
admitted to bail is meant to serve as a first judicial appearance as well as "interpretation" 
of the Bail Statute and the Sheriff Statute. However, those issues are not "new" issues or 
arguments, but were all raised in the proceedings below: that the Bail statute is self-
executing by Appellant (R. 444); whether being admitted to bail serves as a first judicial 
appearance by Appellees (R. 996-997); interpretation of the Bail Statute by Appellant (in 
the Complaint at R.l2 and upon further briefing at R. 436-37); and, that the Sheriff had an 
obligation to ensure Appellant was tracked and transported to the Justice Court (R. 241-
245). Appellees are aware of the arguments set forth in Appellant's Brief because they 
were all addressed in no less than two (2) rounds of briefing and oral argument below, yet 
argues those issues were not raised or preserved. Appellant respectfully submits that the 
issues were preserved below and Appellees' argument is contradicted by the record 
below. 
II. Appellees' Brief requests this Court to reach issues not presented in 
Appellant's Brief. 
Despite the fact that Appellees have not filed a cross-appeal, Appellees' Brief 
invites the Court to go beyond the issues before it and hold that the Appellees cannot be 
liable under United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the 
"§ 1983 analysis"); to hold that the right to an arraignment to hold that Appellees are 
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judicially immune or, alternatively, to hold that the right to an arraignment is not 
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. Appellees' Brief at 44-54. 
A. Application of§ 1983 analysis is improper as it relates to Appellant's Utah 
constitutional law claims. 
Appellees invite the Court to apply a § 1983 analysis to Appellant's Utah 
constitutional claims, arguing that the relief afforded under § 1983 is "substantially the 
same" as Appellant's state law claims. What Appellees truly seek is to apply collateral 
estoppel to the denial of Appellant's federal claims in order to deny Appellant's state law 
claims. This approach has been explicitly rejected by this Court in Jensen ex rei. Jensen 
v. Cunningham, to-wit: "The determinations made by the federal judge, under federal law, 
regarding the materiality of the facts or the inferences that could be drawn from those 
facts were not dispositive as to questions arising under state law." Jensen ex rei. Jensen v. 
Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ~ 44,250 P.3d 465, 477. In Jensen, this Court entertained the 
exact same argument - that it should apply the standard for § 1983 claims to Utah 
constitutional claims - and held that "the standards for state and federal constitutional 
claims are different because they are based on different constitutional language and 
different interpretive case law." !d. at ~45, 477-478. This Court continued that, while the 
U.S. and Utah Constitutions are "substantially the same, similarity oflanguage 'does not 
indicate that this court moves in 'lockstep' with the United States Supreme Court's 
[constitutional] analysis or foreclose our ability to decide in the future that our state 
constitutional provisions afford more rights than the federal Constitution." !d. at ~46, 478 
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citing Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,~ 11 n. 2, 52 P.3d 1158. (Bailey is relied upon by 
Appellees in requesting affirmation of the Final Order on other grounds.) 
Moreover, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution is simpler than 
the Bail Clause, which includes exceptions to the right to bail for capital crimes, 
probationers, parolees, danger to the community or a risk of fleeing the jurisdiction.3 
Indeed, the necessity of the Bail Clause is made clear in State v. Kastanis, wherein this 
Court reviewed its history and stated that the "outright repeal of section 8 [the Bail 
Clause] might inadvertently extinguish a general presumption in favor of allowing release 
on bail prior to conviction of a crime ... " State v. Kastanis, 848 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 
1993). This Court thereafter acknowledged that the exceptions to the Bail Clause "by 
inference guaranteed bail to all others as a matter of right." !d. (Emphasis supplied). 
Ultimately, it is "[t]his court, not the United States Supreme Court, [which] has the 
authority and obligation to interpret Utah's constitutional guarantees ... and we owe 
federal law no more deference in that regard than we do sister state interpretation of 
identical state language." Jensen at ~46. (Emphasis supplied). This Court thereafter went 
on to reject the very application of the law that Appellees now request because analysis of 
3. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, simply, "Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." U.S. Canst. amend. VIII. In contrast, the Utah Constitution 
provides exceptions for, "(l)(a) persons charged with a capital offense .... (b) persons 
charged with a felony while on probation or parole ... (c) persons charged with any other 
crime, ... if there is substantial evidence ... that the person would constitute a substantial 
danger to any other person or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the 
court if released on bail." Utah Canst. art. I, § 8. 
10 
§ 1983 claims "must be based on the language of the Federal Constitution" whereas "to 
recover monetary damages for a violation of the Utah Constitution, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the provision violated by the defendant is self-executing and then must 
establish" the three Spackman factors. !d. at ~4 7. Analysis of the Spackman factors 
"must be based on the language of the Utah Constitution." Id. at ~48. Appellant 
respectfully submits that this Court has made it clear that analysis of Utah constitutional 
claims applies the primacy approach and is an independent analysis of a parties' Utah 
constitutional law claims. 
B. Appellant's lack of a policy for the tracking of inmates makes proving a 
claim against an individual virtually impossible. 
Appellees' Brief also argues that Appellant cannot identify a constitutionally 
defective policy or training by Appellees and therefore Appellant's claims must fail by 
law. However, Appellant cannot identify a policy because there were apparently no 
policies for the tracking of inmates promulgated by Appellees. Appellees' Brief attempts 
to piggyback the legal analysis regarding Appellant's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in asserting 
that Appellant could only be successful if he could prove that Appellees acted "pursuant 
to official municipal policy'' which caused Appellant's injury. Appellees Brief at 45. 
Not only is Appellees' argument improper inasmuch as it attempts to shoehorn an 
inapplicable federal law analysis in support of denying a Utah constitutional claim but 
also fails because the Appellees have admitted that there were simply no policies ever 
promulgated. Specifically, Appellees cannot cite to an actual policy promulgated by Box 
Elder Sheriff J. Lynn Yeates (R. 156) or Commander Sandy Huthman (the officer 
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responsible for the "overall administration of the Jail"- R. 161) regarding the tracking of 
inmates entering and leaving the Jail but merely that it was the general "policy of the Box 
Elder County Jail to accept custody of arrestees who are lawfully presented by an 
arresting officer." R. 156, 161. Appellant respectfully submits that this Court should not 
sanction the Appellees violations of Appellant's Utah constitutional rights when that very 
violation results from their own disregard of their statutory obligations. Such a ruling 
would only incentivize governmental entities to ignore their constitutional and statutory 
obligations to the citizens of Utah as well as those traveling within Utah's borders. 
C. The Deliberate Indifference Standard. 
Appellees request the Court to apply the deliberate indifference standard to claims 
for violations of an arrested person's rights enshrined in the Bail Clause. However, the 
deliberate indifference standard was applied by this Court in Bott because it "protects 
prisoners from cruel and unusual punishments ... " Bott at 740. (Emphasis supplied). 
Arrested persons are not prisoners. Arrestees are constitutionally entitled to legal 
counsel, the right to cross-examine and confront witnesses against them and a trial before 
jury of their peers. And, most importantly, before exercising all of their constitutional 
rights, they are constitutionally entitled to personally appear before a magistrate and be 
admitted to bail where he/she is informed of the charges, advised of the amount of bail 
and inquired of as to whether he/she can afford an attomey.4 Arrested persons are 
4. In order for a habeas corpus petition to "be available," a person needs to be "present" 
before a court. It is not disputed that this never occurred in this case for seventeen (17) 
days. 
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presumed innocent until proven guilty. Appellant therefore submits that the deliberate 
indifference standard is specific to prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment of 
prisoners, not the right of an arrested person to bail, and is inapplicable to claims brought 
under the Bail Clause. 
D. Appellees are not judicially immune. 
Appellees argue out of one side of their mouth that, due to the separation of 
powers amongst the three branches of the government, Appellees do not control the 
Justice Court's calendar and are not liable in any way for the failures of the Justice Court 
while arguing out of the other side of their mouth that they are judicially immune from 
suit for failing to ensure Appellant's right to an arraignment and notice of the setting of 
bail. Appellant respectfully submits that Appellees cannot have it both ways - Appellees 
either do not control the Justice Court, and thus are not judicially immune, or exercise 
control of the Justice Court in which case they owed an obligation to Appellant to ensure 
he was arraigned and admitted to bail. Nonetheless, and most importantly, if the 
Appellees are granted judicial immunity, Appellant truly would be deprived of any 
remedy for the violation of his constitutional rights and there would be no other party 
against whom he could seek redress. 
E. The right to an arraignment is guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Appellees cite to United States v. Coffman, 567 F.2d 960, 961 (lOth Cir. 1977) in 
support of the argument that Appellant does not have a constitutional right to an 
arraignment under the Utah Constitution. However, the appellant in Coffman 
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"acknowledged before going to trial that he had been given a copy of the indictment" and 
did "not claim that he was not fully prepared for trial" such that the Court determined he 
was not prejudiced by the lack of an arraignment. Conversely, in the case at bar, 
Appellant explicitly argues that he was prejudiced by the failure of the Appellees to admit 
Appellant to bail, arraign Appellant of the charges against him and provide notice of the 
amount of bail that had been set. Thus, the facts in Coffman are inapplicable here as is 
the holding in Coffman. 
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been clarified by case law 
since the holding in Coffman, and the notes to Rule 10 provides that, "[r]ead together, 
Rules 10 and 43 require the defendant to be physically present in court for the 
arraignment." See, notes to 2002 Amendments to Fed. R. Crim. P. 10, citing to 
Valenzuela-Gonzales v. United States, 915 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1990). The 
annotations continue, "A critical element to the amendment is that no matter how 
convenient or cost effective a defendant's absence might be, the defendant's right to be 
present in court stands unless he or she waives that right in writing." !d. As is clear from 
the interpretation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 10, the right to be personally present at an 
arraignment is a constitutional right, not an option subject to the convenience of the 
governmental entity in charge of an arrested person. 
F. The record demonstrates that the actions of Appellees directly harmed 
Appellant. 
Appellees again contend that a federal standard- the "direct causal link" standard 
which requires proof that the municipality was the "moving force" behind the violation -
14 
should be applied in this case. Appellees argue that, because the Sheriff and the County 
were not personally aware of Appellant's arrest, Appellees cannot be held liable. Setting 
aside, again, that the Appellees are attempting to apply legal standards for claims under a 
§ 1983 analysis rejected in Jensen, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a 
municipality may be liable if "the action taken or directed by the municipality or its 
authorized decisionmaker itself violates federal law will also determine that the municipal 
action was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains. Bd. of 
Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,405, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1389, 
137 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1997) (Emphasis supplied). In Appellant's case, the Bail Clause 
mandates the fundamental constitutional right to bail and the Bail Statute makes it a class 
B misdemeanor to fail to ensure that an arrested person is brought before a magistrate. 
See, U. C .A. § 77-7-23 ( 4) ( 1997). Thus, even assuming arguendo that the direct causal 
link standard applied, the actions taken by Appellees or their authorized decision makers 
satisfy that standard. 
III. Article 1, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution is Self-Executing. 
Despite Appellees' arguments to the contrary, Appellant respectfully submits that 
this Court's precedent on due process and bail support Appellant's contention that the 
Bail Clause is self-executing. Notably, Appellant cannot provide any case law to the 
contrary. However, this Court has recognized that the Bail Clause "has been a part of this 
State's highest law since statehood" and that, despite amendments clarifying the burden of 
proof, it has in no way been "repudiated or altered the traditional right of one's 
15 
entitlement to bail. .. " Chynoweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081, 1082 (Utah 1977). In 
Chynoweth, this Court stated that, at a bail hearing, "the prosecutor may present proof in 
affidavit form or, as in this case, in the depositional form described to oppose the release 
of those accused but not over the accuseds' objection." !d. (Emphasis supplied). 
Obviously, and in order to object, a person must be present at a bail hearing and presented 
with the information the prosecutor has submitted supporting a bail recommendation lest 
the accused's right to object to the evidence is rendered illusory under Chynoweth. 
Appellees argue that the Bail Clause is not self-executing because that the Bail 
Clause is a "general principle" that "does not supply the means for putting bail into 
effect" and instead requires "statutory implementing legislation." Appellees' Brief at 27. 
This Court, however, has rejected such a stringent application of the self-executing 
analysis. In fact, in Spackman this Court cited to Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 
P.2d 622 (Utah 1990), which reversed over thirty (30) years of Utah precedent dating 
back to Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). In 
Colman, this Court recognized that, "[t]he people of Utah established the Utah 
Constitution as a limitation on the power of government." Colman at 634-635. This 
Court concluded that "article I, section 22 needs no legislation to activate it; it is 
mandatory and obligatory as it is." !d. Likewise, the right to bail pending trial has been 
recognized by this Court as "the fundamental right to bail of one accused of a crime; and 
it does so in mandatory terms." Scott v. Ryan, 548 P.2d 235,236 (Utah 1976) (Emphasis 
supplied). Like the Takings Clause, the Bail Clause is a limitation on the power of 
16 
government- in the case of the Bail Clause, it is a limitation on the power of the 
government to incarcerate an arrested person indefinitely pending trial. The right to be 
free from incarceration pending trial is a recognized,fimdamentalliberty which was 
enshrined in Utah's Constitution from the outset and is thus, Appellant submits, self-
executing. 
Appellees argue that the enactment of the Bail Statute weighs in favor of finding 
that the Bail Clause is not self-executing is also directly contradicted by this Court's 
precedent because the Bail Statute is supplementary legislation. In Batt v. DeLand, this 
Court held that Article I, Section 9, the Unnecessary Rigor/Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause (the "Unnecessary Rigor Clause"), is self-executing. In so holding, 
this Court explicitly stated that, "the fact that the legislature may enact supplementary 
legislation to further protect or regulate a right in a constitutional provision does not 
prevent the provision from being self-executing." Batt v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 
(Utah 1996) abrogated by Spackman ex rei. Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder Cty. 
Sch. Dist., 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533. (Emphasis supplied). Appellant respectfully 
submits that this Court's previous case law supports Appellant's contention that the Bail 
Clause, which this Court has held to be mandatory and which proscribes the fundamental 
right to bail, is self-executing. 
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IV. The Spackman Factors. 
A. Whether Appellant's suffered a flagrant violation of his constitutional rights 
is a question for the jury. 
Appellees do not reply to Appellant's contention that this issue should be 
submitted to a jury of Appellant's peers, but rather that Appellant must identify a specific 
actor or individual in order to move forward with his claim. However, Appellees' 
continued argument that a claim for damages for violation of a right under the Utah 
Constitution requires the identification of an actor would result in depriving Appellant of 
any right to bring a claim because individual government employees are immune from 
suits alleging that they violated a person's rights under the Utah Constitution. In fact, this 
Court has held that a summary judgment is proper even where there existed "a special 
relationship and consequent duty" for the municipality to protect the plaintiff from a 
dangerous mentally ill patient on the grounds that the Governmental Immunity Act 
"grants immunity to all persons performing governmental functions ... " Higgins v. Salt 
Lake Cty., 855 P .2d 231, 240 (Utah 1993) overruled by Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 
2015 UT 64, 356 P .3d 1172. Inasmuch as there is no waiver of immunity in regard to 
Appellant's constitutional claims, even if Appellant were to be able to identify a specific 
individual, that individual would be immune from suit. Thus, Appellant would still be 
left without recourse for the flagrant violation of his Utah constitutional rights under 
Appellees' theory. 
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B. There are no other existing remedies available to Appellant. 
Appellant notes that this factor was not reached by the District Court and is 
therefore not before the Court. Notwithstanding Appellees' argument to the contrary, 
Appellees took the position in Federal Court that Appellant had no remedy available to 
him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court acknowledged that it was apparent from 
Appellees' successful motion to dismiss Appellant's federal claims that Appellant had no 
remedy in federal court, to-wit: "I don't think I could take the position, hey, and ignore 
the fact that the plaintiff presently doesn't have a 1983 action available to him ... " R. 
1002. In fact, the District Court acknowledged that Appellees' argument that Appellant 
had an existing remedy was "illusory," stating "If it's a remedy that might be available, 
where you stipulate to no, it's really not available, then how is there another remedy 
available? It's a little bit circular." R. 1003. (Emphasis supplied). Appellant respectfully 
submits that, as recognized by the District Court, Appellees cannot seek and obtain 
dismissal of Appellant's Federal constitutional law claims and thereafter assert that 
Appellant has an existing remedy available to him via Federal constitutional law claims. 
C. Equitable relief was not available to Appellant. 
Appellant notes that this factor was likewise not reached by the District Court and 
is therefore not before the Court, but is being addressed nonetheless as a matter of 
caution. Appellees assert, without citation to supporting case law, that Appellant sought 
no equitable remedy and therefore cannot now claim that one was not available. 
However, even the District Court acknowledged the tenuous nature of Appellees 
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argument, specifically stating that "we're talking about a time oflimited duration and 
being able to process a habe[ as]" corpus action. R. 1023. Appellant respectfully submits 
the notion that he - an unrepresented person arrested just before one of the biggest 
American holidays of the year - would have been able to successfully bring a habeas 
action in sufficient time to achieve his release and not have the issue mooted is 
unpersuasive. Even if Appellant had filed a habeas action the day after his arrest, Utah R. 
App. P. 20 allows for the respondent to "answer the petition or otherwise plead within ten 
days after service of a copy of the petition" which would then be set for oral argument. 
Utah R. App. P. 20(b)(2). The notion that Appellant could have brought a pro se5 habeas 
corpus action during the time he was incarcerated, while complying with the procedure 
for a habeas action would be completed before Appellant's release, is simply not feasible. 
Alternatively, in emergency situations, a petition could be filed "with a justice or judge 
of the court." However, given that the Justice Court was not open for Appellant to be 
personally present to be admitted to bail, a habeas action to the Justice Court would 
likewise have been futile. Utah R. App. P. 20(b)(l). Appellant therefore submits that it 
was not realistic for Appellant to successfully bring a habeas action before his release 
such that he did not have an equitable relief available to him. 
5. Had there been an initial admission to bail and determination as to whether Appellant 
would be entitled to appointed legal counsel, this argument might have merit. 
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V. Appellees do not Claim that Appellant was ever provided notice of the 
amount of bail. 
One glaring omission from Appellees' Brief is any reference to a fact, supported 
by the record, that Appellant was ever provided notice of the amount of his bail by any 
government actor prior to his arraignment in July. In fact, Appellant submitted an 
affidavit to the contrary confirming, under oath, that the amount of bail set by the Justice 
Court was never communicated to him. R. 424. The District Court even acknowledged 
that "there's a factual issue about whether plaintiff had notice that bail had been set." R. 
992.6 Despite the acknowledgment by the District Court that there remained a factual 
dispute as to whether Appellant had been provided notice of the amount of bail, the 
District Court then went on to fmd that, "the fact is that his - he was able to post bail for 
his crime, because the Judge had set bail. So it was followed. Bail had been set, so the 
words of the bail clause were followed." !d. (Emphasis supplied). Appellant respectfully 
submits that the setting of bail without providing notice to the arrested person of the 
amount of their bail is tantamount to not granting bail whatsoever, as the incarcerated 
person would have no way of gauging how to make appropriate arrangements for the 
posting of bail or whether posting bail is even feasible. Appellant respectfully submits 
that a failure to provide notice of the amount of bail to an arrested person is substantively 
the same as failing to admit an arrested person to bail altogether. 
6. This factual dispute also goes to the flagrant issue that should be decided by the jury. 
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VI. A citation is not the legal equivalent of an Information. 
Appellees erroneously argue that the DUI citation issued to Appellant is the 
"statutory equivalent of an Information." when, in fact, a citation may7 be used as an 
information but is not the same as an information. Appellees' Brief at 34. U.C.A. §77-7-
21 (2009) provides that a citation "may be used in lieu of an information to which the 
person cited may plead guilty or no contest and be sentenced or on which bail may be 
forfeited." The fact the statute states that a person may plead guilty, no contest or be 
sentenced clearly demonstrates the Legislature's intent that the arrested person is to be 
personally present, regardless of whether the arraignment takes place upon issuance of a 
citation clearly contemplates being admitted to bail or released. Importantly, the citation 
in this case was not used as the Information or the arresting officer would have been 
required to take the Appellant immediately before a magistrate. 
The sections subsequent to U.C.A. §77-7-21 further support Appellant's argument 
that a personal appearance is required. U.C.A. §77-7-23 (1997)- titled "Delivery of 
prisoner arrested without warrant to magistrate" - provides that when, "an arrest is made 
without a warrant by a peace officer ... the person arrested shall be taken without 
unnecessary delay to the magistrate in the ... the municipality in which the offense 
occurred ... " and further requires that an "information stating the charge against the 
person shall be made before the magistrate." U.C.A. §77-7-23(l)(a) (1997). (Emphasis 
supplied). 
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Despite Appellees' repeated contention that personally appearing before a 
magistrate is not material to a person's right to bail or an arraignment, the statute 
explicitly addresses the procedure in the event a magistrate is unavailable, to-wit: 
"If the justice court judge of the precinct or municipality .. .is not 
available, the arrested person shall be taken before the magistrate 
within the same county who is nearest to the scene of the alleged 
offense ... who may act as committing magistrate for arraigning the 
accused, setting bail, or issuing warrants." U.C.A. §77-7-23(l)(b) 
(1997)(Emphasis supplied). 
In fact, the requirement of an appearance before a magistrate is so strict that the 
Legislature made failure to comply a class B misdemeanor. See, U.C.A. §77-7-23(4). 
This Court likewise emphasized compliance with the arraignment procedures in reversing 
the denial of a petition to prohibit the pursuit of a drunk driving complaint because it "is 
not the defendant's duty to prove" that he was not taken to the appropriate magistrate, 
"but only to claim that this was not done, since it is the state's duty to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that it followed statutory interdictions ... " Wells v. City Court of Logan 
City, Cache Cty., 535 P.2d 683, 684 (Utah 1975). 
The clear language of the applicable statutes, and this Court's interpretation, 
betrays Appellees' preferred interpretation of the requirement that Appellees ensure an 
arrested person's arraignment and being admitted to bail (that the simple submission of 
citation sufficient satisfies Appellees obligations) and instead makes it clear that the 
Legislature intended that an arrested person be personally brought before a magistrate. 
7. By using the discretionary term "may," the Legislature gave discretion that was not 
used in this case as an Information was later filed in July. 
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Assuring an arraignment via personal appearance before a magistrate is a constitutional 
measure meant to assure that an arrested person is hailed before a neutral judicial officer 
who can inform the arrested person of their right to bail, the amount of their bail and 
ensure that the arrested person understands their constitutional rights. The phrase 
"without unnecessary delay'' would be made a legal nullity if Appellees' interpretation 
were adopted, as allowance for a seventeen ( 17) day delay in arraigning an arrested 
person would not necessitate the U.C.A. §77-7-23(l)(b)'s alternative arraignment 
procedure. Moreover, arraignments now regularly take place via videoconferencing 
easing any potential burden that Appellees might assert prevents the transfer of an 
arrested person from the jail to the courthouse. 
VII. The District Court Judge explicitly based his ruling on facts not in the 
record. 
Appellees' Brief further alleges that there is "nothing in the record that suggests 
that the Justice Court attempted to have a hearing with Plaintiff present" and that "if 
Plaintiff were transported sooner by Defendant, he would have arrived at a vacant 
courthouse." Appellees' Brief at 22. However, because the full facts were never 
developed during the course of a trial, Appellees' Brief does not, and cannot, cite to any 
portion of the record that supports the notion that Appellant would have been transported 
to an empty court room had he been transported in the regular course of the Jail's 
functioning. Despite the lack of factual support, however, the District Court explicitly 
relied on such factual representations by the Appellees in reaching its decision to grant 
the Motion for Summary Judgment when the District Court stated on the record that, 
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So based on the Court's prior ruling, together with finalizing that 
question mark from paragraph 7, I cannot hold Box Elder County 
responsible and liable in this situation, especially has not been shown 
that the results would have been any different-- well, I don't even have 
to go there. But ifthe Judge is not available, frankly there's no one for 
the jail, there's no one for the prosecutor to process the plaintiff in front 
of. 
That's the basis of my ruling. You know, if I'm wrong, I'm wrong, 
Counsel. I just can't subject Box Elder County to liability without 
identifying that actor nor that- appropriately that fragrant [sic] act." R. 
1067-68. 
As is clear from the record below, and despite Appellees' protestations to the 
contrary, the District Court relied upon "facts" proffered by Appellees - facts which 
should have been presented via testimony and subjected to cross examination before a 
jury, who would then be in the best position to determine whether Appellant should be 
awarded damages, and in what amount, for being incarcerated for seventeen (17) days 
without being admitted to bail. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in replacing the jury as the finder of fact. This Court 
should reverse the District Court's Final Order and remand with instructions to set the 
matter for a jury trial regarding Appellees' violation( s) of Appellant's Constitutional 
Rights under Article I, § 7 and Article I, § 8 of the Utah Constitution. 
DATED this 5th day of June, 2017. 
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